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CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
THE REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE-AN
ABUSE OR PROPER EXERCISE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
BANKRUPTCY POWER?
HARVEY R. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout American history, one or more sectors of the populace
have characterized the bankruptcy law or the anticipated enactment
of bankruptcy legislation as an abuse. As far back as 1792, Thomas
Jefferson and nearly all of the representatives from Virginia were
opposed to a national bankruptcy system because such a system would
enable a creditor to reach the property of a debtor, "whereas under
Virginia statutes freehold land could not be taken on execution."' By
contrast, creditors holding liens and encumbrances on property of a
debtor traditionally have argued that debtors abuse the bankruptcy
law by abrogating their contracts and impairing the rights of secured
creditors. 2 More recently, similar sentiments have been sounded by
representatives of the consumer finance industry, who have prevailed
on members of Congress to support legislation amending provisions of
the current bankruptcy law. These representatives argue that, in the
consumer bankruptcy context, the current provisions "have altered
the balance of equities between debtors and creditors in bankruptcy
excessively in favor of debtors."'3
In contrast to the efforts of financial institutions and consumer
finance companies to restrict the implementation of the "fresh start"
policy of American bankruptcy law, organized labor has been a con-
sistent supporter of a fresh start for individuals under the bankruptcy
law. 4 With the decline in the economic viability of "smoke stack"
* LL.B. 1959, Columbia University Law School; Member, New York Bar;
Partner, Wel, Gotshal & Manges, New York. The author wishes to thank Peter A.
Langerman for his research assistance on this Article.
1. C. Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 16 (1935).
2. See id. at 30, 158-59.
3. 129 Cong. Rec. S.384-85 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983) (statement of Sen. Dole
regarding S. 445 immediately prior to passage by Senate).
4. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil &
Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2451-52
(1976) (statement of Robert A. Georgine, Pres., Building & Constr. Trades Dep't,
AFL-CIO) (fully supporting proposed bankruptcy bill).
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industries, however, and the deregulation of other heavily-unionized
segments of the economy, we have come full circle and it is now the
unions that are complaining of bankruptcy abuse. 5 They contend that
the power of the bankruptcy court to approve the rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement, which is an executory contract under
the bankruptcy law,0 is an abuse of the bankruptcy power vested in
Congress by the Constitution.7 This Article examines that complaint
and concludes that the national policy for the reorganization and
rehabilitation of financially distressed businesses does not irreconcila-
bly conflict with the policy underlying the labor laws.
I. OBJECTIVES OF BUSINESS REORGANIZATION
The essence of business reorganization as well as liquidation under
the bankruptcy law is the "fresh start" policy." Over 140 years ago, it
was determined that American bankruptcy law should include provi-
sions enabling businesses or individuals to rehabilitate themselves,
without the necessity of liquidating and dismembering their assets and
properties. 9 This concept developed and was substantially formalized
in the passage of emergency legislation during the Great Depression, 10
and thereafter, in the Chandler Act of 1938."1 These provisions, as
well as the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and
5. Unions have not hesitated to seek the protection of the bankruptcy courts to
serve their own purposes. In In re American Fed'n of T.V. & Radio Artists, 32 Bankr.
672 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), the union attempted to use the Bankruptcy Code (Code)
to relieve itself of a treble damage judgment for antitrust violations on the ground
that such trebling constituted an unenforceable penalty under the Code. Id. at 673.
The union's attempt failed. Id. at 674.
6. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (1984).
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has the power "[tjo establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies thoughout the United States."). Henry
A. Duffy, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, stated that use of bankruptcy
law to modify collective bargaining agreements creates "a scenario for the wholesale
eradication of the rights of workers." BNA Daily Labor Report, Oct. 5, 1983, at E-3.
8. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doe. No. 137 pt. 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1973), reprinted in Collier on
Bankruptcy app. 2 (15th ed. 1983); see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188,
1197 (1984) ("policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors").
9. See C. Warren, supra note 1, at 60.
10. See, e.g., Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911-12 (adding § 77B
regarding corporate reorganizations generally); Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat.
1467 (adding provisions regarding general compositions and extensions, agricultural
compositions, and reorganizations of interstate railroads).
11. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (adding chapters X, XI, XII regarding business
reorganizations and chapter XIII regarding individual payment plans). This emer-
gency legislation was incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544 (superceded by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151,326 (1982)).
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similar entities, express the national policy that the best interests of the
nation are promoted by affording commercial and industrial concerns
the protection of the bankruptcy law while they undergo financial
and business rehabilitation. Such rehabilitation enables them to
emerge from bankruptcy proceedings as viable economic units con-
tributing to the gross national product, preserving jobs and promoting
efficient use of economic resources. 12 This policy was reaffirmed and
accentuated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,13 which provides
the devices and substantive law that permit effective reorganization.
One of the most important of these devices is the power to reject
executory contracts. 14
Congress recognized from the outset that the uniform bankruptcy
laws, including the power to reject executory contracts, impaired
contractual rights. The congressional debates over the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 are replete with statements and argu-
ments concerning the power of Congress to impair such rights.' 5
Nonetheless, Congress concluded that it possessed the power to pass
such legislation. 6
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld bankruptcy
laws that have the effect of impairing contractual rights. In 1902, the
Court in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses17 stated that "[t]he subject
12. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1197 (1984).
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151,326 (1982). These sections include the Bankruptcy
Code, the substantive law of bankruptcy.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) provides that, with certain exceptions, a trustee or
debtor-in-possession, "subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Rejection of executory contracts
is a traditional bankruptcy power. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840,
880-81 (1938) (superceded by 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982)).
15. See C. Warren, supra note 1, at 30, 158-59. In 1840, Henry Clay stated that
"[t]he right of the [nation] to the use of the unimpaired faculties of its citizens as
producers, as consumers, and as defenders of the Commonwealth, is paramount to
any rights or relations which can be created between citizen and citizen." Id. at 159.
One year later, Congressman William P. Fessenden of Maine stated in connection
with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841:
The power of Government to pass laws affecting the obligation of con-
tracts is derived from the nature of the Government itself. . . . It is a
necessary power; for it is by no means difficult to imagine a condition of
things in which the safety and well being of the Nation would imperatively
demand its exercise. Take the case, for example, in which a whole commu-
nity becomes insolvent by some stupendous accident, or by some magnifi-
cent but fallacious scheme, such as other countries have seen and felt at no
distant day. Can it be pretended that a power to apply a remedy to a
disorder that is paralyzing and destroying the body politic exists nowhere?
Such an idea is a libel upon the very name of Government.
Id. at 158.
16. See id. at 14, 19.
17. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
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of 'bankruptcies' includes the power to discharge the debtor from his
contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property."18
Thus, "[t]he grant to Congress involves the power to impair the
obligation of contracts."' 9 More recent examples include United States
v. Security Industrial Bank,20 which dealt with the voiding of non-
purchase money interests relating to consumer debtor cases, and
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,21 which upheld the rejection of collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
A primary benefit of the business reorganization process is the
freezing or suspension of creditor remedies and debtor obligations by
the filing of a chapter 11 petition, which affords the time to determine
and resolve problems in management, operations and finance. Most
business reorganizations involve over-expanded and over-extended
businesses whose ability to operate profitably has been eradicated by
increased costs, changing markets, natural disasters or any of a host of
other problems. Chapter 11 is remedial legislation. It sometimes re-
quires radical surgery to save the core business and the jobs it pro-
vides.
Historically, many reorganization cases have been filed to obtain
relief from burdensome executory contracts such as long-term real
property leases, equipment leases, and supply agreements.2 2 Until the
mid-1970's, however, the power to reject collective bargaining agree-
ments was used sparingly because it was not practical and would not
further the goals of business reorganization. 23 During most of that
time, the labor movement was strong and vibrant, and most bank-
ruptcy reorganization cases involved non-public corporations located
in major industrial centers with highly visible organized labor move-
ments. Attempts to reject collective bargaining agreements in that
context invariably W'ould have been exercises in futility. The busi-
nesses involved could not obtain substitute labor and could not sustain
themselves during the course of a strike; thus, while the statutory
power existed, in practical terms it was illusory.
The world has changed dramatically. Membership in unions is
declining, 24 and in many areas of the country, alternative sources of
18. Id. at 188.
19. Id.
20. 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
21. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
22. See, e.g., In re United Cigar Stores Co., 89 F.2d 3, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1937) (lease);
In re Cheney Bros., 12 F. Supp. 605, 607 (D. Conn. 1935) (same).
23. See Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 319-
20 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways,
Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F.
Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See infra notes 26-27.
24. See The de-unionisation of America, The Economist, Oct. 29, 1983, at 71.
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labor are available. 25 A strike no longer means the termination of a
business. 26 Consequently, the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments has become a more viable option in reorganization proceedings.
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. Standard for Approving Rejection
A collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract subject
to rejection, or court-approved breach of contract,2 7 in accordance
with section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) .28 Section 365 con-
tains no language requiring that interests of other creditors and parties'
in interest be sacrificed in favor of the preservation of collective
bargaining agreements or the preferred treatment of employees.2,
Indeed, when Congress determined that certain types of contracts,
such as shopping center leases, should be accorded different treat-
ment, it had no difficulty in enacting special requirements under the
Code to evidence that difference. 30
Under the "business judgment" test traditionally applied to requests
for rejection of executory contracts, a debtor must show only that
rejection will benefit the estate1.3 Despite the absence of any specific
statutory language, courts generally have applied a stricter standard
to rejection of collective bargaining agreements than to rejection of
other executory contracts in an effort to accommodate national labor
policies and promote the efficacy of the collective bargaining pro-
cess. 
32
25. See Givebacks at Eastern and Greyhound, Dun's Business Month, Jan. 1984,
at 24, col. 3 (striking Greyhound drivers replaced by non-union workers).
26. See id.
27. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (1984).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). A "claim arising from the rejection under section
365 of this title ... , of an executory contract ... shall be allowed ... or disallowed
• ..the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition."
Id. § 502(g).
29. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1194-95 (1984); In re
Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 896-97 (11th Cir. 1983).
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (1982). Despite the existence and ability of Con-
gress to legislate special requirements, a national bankruptcy law should not be
emasculated by the inclusion of such special interest legislation. Such legislation
invariably reduces the effectiveness of a statute by granting preferential treatment to
some group to the detriment of other parties in interest.
31. See Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318
U.S. 523, 549-50 (1943); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 365.03, at 365-14 to 365-16 (15th
ed. 1984).
32. See, e.g., In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 897-98 (l1th Cir.
1983); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164,
168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v.
(Vol. 521124
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The seminal case elucidating the different and more stringent stan-
dards applicable to the rejection of collective bargaining agreements is
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.33 The
Second Circuit held that rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment under the former Bankruptcy Act required determinations that
(1) the agreement is onerous and burdensome and (2) the competing
equities favor the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.3 4
One month after Kevin Steel Products, the Second Circuit in Brother-
hood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.35
enunciated an even more demanding test for the rejection of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement: Rejection should not be authorized unless
it is established that in the absence of such rejection the debtor "will
collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs."'36 Although
it is unlikely that the Second Circuit meant to substantively change
the judge-made standards of Kevin Steel Products, the courts subse-
quently applied a stricter two-step analysis derived from REA Ex-
press.37
The first step of this analysis required the determination that the
collective bargaining agreement was onerous and burdensome to the
debtor and would cause the collapse of the debtor's business. The
debtor's objectives of improving its competitive position and matching
the lower labor costs of competitors were not sufficient grounds for
approval of rejection .3 The debtor, under this analysis, had to estab-
lish that the alternative to rejection was liquidation.
The second step of the analysis required a "balancing of the equi-
ties," a subjective exercise not susceptible to precise quantification or
Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975). For two differing
interpretations of the development of judicial standards for approval of rejection of
collective bargaining agreements, see Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 Am. Bank. L.J. 293,
332 (1983) (bankruptcy court should not approve rejection if it appears that debtor
might reorganize successfully without rejection) and Pulliam, The Rejection of Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements Under 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 Am. Bank.
L.J. 1, 39-41 (1984) (business judgment standard for rejection of executory contracts
should apply to collective bargaining agreements because it provides speed, flexibility
and predictability).
33. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
34. Id. at 707 (citing In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-
62 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
35. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
36. Id. at 172.
37. See In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Note,
The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 134, 149 (1981).
38. In re Connecticut Celery Co., 23 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 68, 77 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1980).
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qualification. Courts considered such factors as: (1) the good or bad
faith of the debtor and the union in their negotiations and prior
dealings with each other; (2) management's termination of unprofit-
able operations; (3) the spreading of the pain of the reorganization
process among all interested groups, including reductions in compen-
sation of management and non-union groups, if appropriate; (4) the
impact of liquidation on the debtor and its employees; (5) the poten-
tial consequences of a strike for the debtor; (6) the adequacy of relief
from rejection for employees and other claimants, taking into consid-
eration the elimination of contractual fringe benefits such as seniority
and pension rights and the impact that such claims may have on the
debtor's ability to reorganize; and (7) the proportion of employees
covered by the collective bargaining agreement.3 9 The weight to be
given to each of the foregoing factors or such other factors that a court
decided were pertinent was a matter of discretion. As a result, pre-
dicting the outcomes was very difficult.
In 1982, the wisdom of REA Express and its progeny was chal-
lenged by a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
In re Bildisco.40 Construing section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Third Circuit specifically rejected the REA Express standard for rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement and proclaimed that the
more reasonable standard to be applied was aptly set forth in Kevin
Steel Products.41
The court criticized REA Express on two specific grounds. First, it
noted the difficulty of predicting the success of a reorganization case
in its early stages.42 Second, it considered the preservation of jobs to be
a more important consideration than the enforced continuation of a
collective bargaining agreement. 43 The decision of the Third Circuit
reflects a greater deference to the business judgment of management
and a desire to establish standards that do not subordinate the inter-
ests of non-labor creditors and other parties in interest to those of
labor groups.44
The Third Circuit's decision in In re Bildisco turned the tide of
court decisions from the rigid application of the REA Express stan-
dards. The departure from REA Express was refined by the Eleventh
Circuit in In re Brada Miller Freight System, 45 in which the court
39. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 899-900 (11th Cir. 1983);
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 218-19 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (mem.).
40. 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104
S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
41. Id. at 79.
42. Id. at 80.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 75-76.
45. 702 F.2d 890 (l1th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 521126
1984] CHAPTER 11 AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1127
elaborated on the "balancing of the equities" standard. 46 Subsequent
cases, particularly at the bankruptcy court level, although not indis-
criminately approving rejection, have relied on the rationales of the
Third and Eleventh Circuits in considering requests for the approval
of rejection of collective bargaining agreements under section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 47
While the lower courts were struggling with the conflict between
the highly restrictive standard set by the Second Circuit and the more
relaxed standard set by the Third and Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme
Court was considering the issue in the context of the Third Circuit's
decision in In re Bildisco. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (Bildisco) ,48
the Court was presented with two issues: (1) the proper standard for
permitting the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, and (2)
the ability of a trustee or debtor-in-possession to unilaterally modify
the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to
court approval of rejection and in spite of the provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governing such modification.49
The Court unanimously affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit
regarding the proper standard for rejection of collective bargaining
agreements. 50 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, recognized
that "there is no indication in § 365 .. .that rejection of collective-
bargaining agreements should be governed by a standard different
from that governing other executory contracts." 51 Nevertheless, Justice
Rehnquist noted that every court of appeals that had considered this
issue had concluded that a more stringent standard should be applied
to rejection of collective bargaining agreements than to other execu-
tory contracts. 52 Thus, the Court agreed that the "special nature" of
collective bargaining agreements requires that a "somewhat stricter
standard" govern their rejection. 3
As to the critical choice between the "forced liquidation" test of
REA Express and the "onerous and burdensome" test of In re Bildisco,
the Supreme Court adopted the latter, stating that the agreement
46. Id. at 899-900. See supra text accompanying note 33.
47. See, e.g., In re Rath Packing Co., 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 498, 503
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 1984); In re Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 27 Bankr.
293, 297 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983).
48. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
49. Id. at 1191.
50. Id. at 1201.
51. Id. at 1195.
52. Id.; see In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 897-98 (11th Cir.
1983); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72,79 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel
Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1975).
53. 104 S. Ct. at 1195.
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must burden the estate and the balance of the equities must favor
rejection. 4 The court concluded that the REA Express test was "fun-
damentally at odds with the policies of flexibility and equity built into
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code," and unjustifiably subordinated
the "multiple, competing considerations underlying a Chapter 11 re-
organization" to consideration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 55
With respect to balancing the equities, the bankruptcy courts must
consider the interests of all affected parties-the debtor, creditors and
employees-but the focus of the inquiry should be on the "ultimate
goal of Chapter 11" to rehabilitate the debtor. 56 The Court noted that
"the Bankruptcy Court must consider not only the degree of hardship
faced by each party, but also any qualitative differences between the
types of hardship each may face."57 It specified the following equita-
ble considerations: "the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for
the debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims
that would follow from affirmance and the hardship that would
impose on them, and the impact of rejection on the employees."' 8 The
Court further noted that "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not authorize
free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather
only how the equities relate to the success of the reorganization."59
Thus, the beneficiaries of a collective bargaining agreement, like
other claimants in a chapter 11 case, must make sacrifices to achieve a
successful reorganization.
The Supreme Court appears to have elevated a formerly equitable
consideration to the level of a prerequisite for approval of rejection. In
reaching its decision, a bankruptcy court must be convinced that
"reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been
made and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solu-
tion."60 If the debtor cannot demonstrate that (1) it has made "reason-
able efforts" to modify the agreement and (2) such efforts are "not
likely" to yield "prompt and satisfactory" results, the bankruptcy
court will not intervene, and apparently, the request for approval of
rejection would be denied.61
54. Id. at 1196.
55. Id. at 1196; see In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 897 (11th Cir.
1983).
56. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
57. Id.
58. Id. Other courts interpreting this language are likely to consider additional
equities that were mentioned in cases prior to the Supreme Court's Bildisco decision.
See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
59. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
60. Id. at 1196.
61. Id.
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B. Rejection Prior to Court Approval
The second issue presented to the Supreme Court in Bildisco was
whether a trustee or a debtor-in-possession is guilty of an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a) or 8(d) of the NLRA6 2 for unilaterally
rejecting or modifying a collective bargaining agreement before ap-
proval of rejection by the bankruptcy court . 3 On this issue the Court
split five to four, holding that such unilateral rejection was not an
unfair labor practice. 4 The majority concluded that, as a matter of
62. Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976),
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7];
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees ....
Id. Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides in pertinent part:
(d) Obligation to bargain collectively
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employ-
ees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, . . . Pro-
vided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract cover-
ing employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modifi-
cation-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the
proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date
thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days
prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of
negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifica-
tions;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty
days after such notice of the existence of a dispute . . . and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-
out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty
days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract,
whichever occurs later:
The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by
paragraphs (2) to (4) . . . shall not be construed as requiring either party to
discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained
in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective
before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of
the contract.
Id. § 158(d).
63. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
64. Id. at 1201.
1129
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statutory interpretation, "the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
means that the collective-bargaining agreement is no longer immedi-
ately enforceable, and may never be enforceable again." 15 As the
Second Circuit noted in Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack
Corp. ,66 an executory contract is a "contract in limbo" until it is
assumed or rejected. 67 Therefore, a trustee or a debtor-in-possession is
not bound either by the mid-term modification procedures or by the
"bargain to impasse" requirement set forth in section 8(d) and section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 6s
In reaching this conclusion, the majority rejected the Third Cir-
cuit's reliance on the "new entity" theory.69 Some lower courts had
attempted to justify approval of rejection of executory contracts on the
theory that the debtor-in-possession, created upon the filing of a
chapter 11 petition, is not bound by the contracts of the debtor. 70 The
majority found this theory to be unnecessary, stating:
For our purposes, it is sensible to view the debtor-in-possession as
the same "entity" which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy
petititon, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal
with its contracts and property in a manner it could not have done
absent the bankruptcy filing.7'
As a matter of policy, the majority decision regarding unilateral
modification is consistent with the "fundamental purpose of reorgani-
zation"-"to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an
attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources. 72 A
debtor-in-possession may be seriously weakened during the period
between the filing of a chapter 11 petition and approval of rejection if
forced to abide by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. A
65. Id. at 1199.
66. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
67. Id. at 320. If the debtor-in-possession receives benefits under any executory
contract prior to its assumption or rejection, Bildisco requires that the debtor-in-
possession must pay the reasonable value of those services. 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
68. 104 S. Ct. at 1200 & n.14.
69. See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
70. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d
164, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local Union No.
455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. In re Brada
Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 894-96 (11th Cir. 1983) (debtor-in-possession may
constitute a new entity for some purposes but is indistinguishable from the pre-
bankruptcy corporation with respect to obligations under the collective bargaining
agreement).
71. 104 S. Ct. at 1197; see In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 894-96
(11th Cir. 1983).
72. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
73. Id. at 1201 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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hearing on the rejection issue can take several weeks, even months.
Unless the trustee can take immediate steps to shore up the operational
and financial structure of the business, the goals of chapter 11 will be
poorly served.
The minority opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun and White, criticized the majority for failing, on the
unilateral rejection issue, to properly accommodate the policies of the
NLRA and the collective bargaining process.7 3 Justice Brennan ac-
cused the majority of giving too much deference to the bankruptcy
law. He urged that adherence to the collective bargaining agreement
pending approval of rejection, subject to section 8(d) of the NLRA,
"will not seriously undermine the chances for a successful reorganiza-
tion." 7 4 Justice Brennan argued that "the option to violate a collective-
bargaining agreement before it is rejected is scarcely vital to insuring
successful reorganization, 7 5 although such an option may in fact
induce "economic warfare." 76
The minority opinion fails to take into account the realities of the
business world. In every instance of a chapter 11 case involving rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, either the chapter 11 peti-
tion or the application for approval of rejection has been preceded by
extended litigation with the collective bargaining agent. Ordinarily
the failure to obtain the requisite concessions from the union is a
primary cause of the chapter 11 filing. Indeed, the labor unrest re-
ferred to by the minority is usually extant and the trustee or debtor-in-
possession must decide whether it can operate the business and retain
some employees or whether it should close down entirely with the
attendant discharge of all employees. 77 The minority opinion, by
focusing upon the purported issue of "premature rejection," misper-
ceives the problem of compelled adherence to existing terms and
conditions, particularly work rules, of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
The Supreme Court decision in Bildisco is not a deathblow to
unions, and the significance of the case should not be exaggerated.
The decision is consistent with those of every circuit but one, and
Bildisco has not had the effect of wholesale resort to the bankruptcy
74. Id. at 1210.
75. Id. at 1209.
76. Id. at 1208.
77. For example, at the time Continental Air Lines filed its chapter 11 petition,
the company employed approximately 12,000 people. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1983,
at A20, col. 3. Because of Continental's ability to modify its collective bargaining
agreements, it has been able to continue operations and provide employment, as of
early 1984, for 6,000 people. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1984, at D1, col. 3. Continen-
tal hopes and expects to continue to increase the size of its labor force. Id.
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courts by businesses for the purpose of rejecting collective bargaining
agreements. Notwithstanding the cries of anguish and large-scale pub-
lic relations campaigning by organized labor, 78 viable and well-capi-
talized businesses do not resort to the bankruptcy courts to resolve
their labor disputes. A board of directors does not pass a resolution to
file a chapter 11 petition with any sense of ecstasy. Despite the era of
the liberal society, bankruptcy still bears the stigma of failure.
Generally, debtors that file petitions under chapter 11 and seek to
reject collective bargaining agreements are grasping for survival in a
competitive business environment. 79 To characterize the efforts of
these debtors to salvage their businesses and the jobs of employees,
albeit sometimes under different compensation levels and work rules,
as "union-busting" is a misnomer, and to attribute bad faith to such
debtors is counterproductive. Furthermore, the federal courts are
certainly capable of discerning those rare cases in which a debtor files
for bankruptcy merely to escape its obligations under a collective
bargaining agreement.8 0 Indeed, the close scrutiny mandated by the
78. See Barbash, Inside: The Federal Judiciary, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1983, at
A2, col. 1.
79. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 623,
624 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 1984); In re Rath Packing Co., 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 498, 499 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 1984).
80. Under the former Bankruptcy Act, debtors filing under §§ 74, 77, 77B,
Chapter IX and Chapter X had to comply with an express good faith filing require-
ment, and courts often read into the Bankruptcy Act a similar requirement for cases
filed under Chapters XI and XII. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 555-57
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). Section 921(c) of the Code, however, relating to petitions
filed under Chapter IX (municipalities), is the only provision that expressly condi-
tions the right to file a petition on the good faith of the debtor at the time the case is
commenced. 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1982). Nevertheless, it has been held that good faith
is an implicit prerequisite for filing a Chapter 11 petition. See In re Northwest
Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) ("Good
faith... is merged into the power of the court to protect its jurisdictional integrity
from schemes of improper petitioners seeking to circumvent jurisdictional restrictions
and from petitioners with demonstrable frivolous purposes absent any economic
reality.").
In those cases in which courts have found bad faith surrounding the filing of a
petition, the debtor has engaged in some form of misconduct or is not legitimately
attempting a reorganization. See, e.g., In re Nikron, 27 Bankr. 773, 778 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1983) (debtor not engaged in any ongoing business); In re Landmark
Capital Co., 27 Bankr. 273, 281-82 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983) (purpose of filing to
frustrate enforcement of power of sale provision under deed of trust). In In re Tinti
Constr. Co., 29 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983), the debtors had moved to reject
a union contract. The court refused to approve the rejection because (1) even if the
contract were rejected, the business would in all likelihood fail, and (2) the debtor's
sole purpose in filing was to avoid the union contract-the debtor's schedules re-
flected that all bills were either current or had been paid, and the only other claims
were those of the union. Id. at 974-75.
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Supreme Court in Bildisco ensures that the federal courts will uncover
such impropriety. To charge that any Chapter 11 debtor that an-
nounces its intention of seeking approval of the rejection of its collec-
tive bargaining agreements is guilty of bad faith is to be "oblivious to
the obvious."
CONCLUSION
If the national policy for the reorganization and rehabilitation of
financially distressed debtors is to be served, the Bankruptcy Code
must be given effect as enacted and in conformity with that national
policy. The furtherance of this expressed national policy does not
undermine the underlying policies of the labor laws. The intervention
of bankruptcy, as in the case of all commercial relationships, creates a
new arena for the adjustment and enforcement of rights and obliga-
tions. Indeed, it is in the interests of the nation and of labor that
businesses be resuscitated, prosper and provide continued employ-
ment. It would be a grave error for Congress to yield to continuing
union pressures and adopt legislation further restricting the debtor's
ability to reject collective bargaining agreements, because of the resul-
tant negative impact on the ability of distressed business entities to
reorganize.
The theme of chapter 11 is consensus. The objective is the formula-
tion of a business plan, or plan of reorganization, that will achieve
consensual acceptance. Successful reorganization plans are formu-
lated through cooperative efforts of give and take, rather than
through the use of protracted and expensive litigation tactics that
usually result in prejudice and injury to all concerned. Labor repre-
sentatives must learn to work with management in the reorganization
effort in order to save the debtor's business and the jobs that this
business will provide if it is able to survive.
